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ABSTRACT
Modern waterway networks are ageing and need to be renewed, yet the institu-
tional context in the waterway sector is averse to change because of path
dependencies. Waterway renewal requires actors to navigate between institu-
tional reproduction and change. Applying an innovative framework for analysing
institutions in a case study of the Dutch national waterways, we mainly ﬁnd
instances of institutional reproduction, which turns waterway renewal into a
technical and ﬁnancial exercise. However, institutional change becomes increas-
ingly evident through a new functional-relational path, suggesting that planning
for waterway renewal also entails reconsidering novel waterway conﬁgurations
and incorporating neighbouring spatial developments.
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Introduction
Modern waterway networks in the Western world are rapidly ageing. Major components of these
systems, such as weirs, bridges, and navigation locks, have reached or are approaching a state of
maturity (and partial decline). This development marks a clear need for renewal and renovation
(EIB, 2016; Gil & Beckman, 2009; Van Dorsser, 2015). In addition to the technical and climate
change-related challenges pertaining to deteriorating waterway infrastructure, societal demands
may have altered considerably since the initial construction date. Renewal of waterway networks is
presented as a change imperative: the focus of organisations responsible for infrastructure plan-
ning shifts from developing to redeveloping networks (Bolton & Foxon, 2015; Graham & Thrift,
2007; Kanter, 2015). However, previous research has demonstrated that the costs embedded in
waterway infrastructure and institutions have created a context that is rigid and resistant to
change (Banister, Anderton, Bonilla, Givoni, & Schwanen, 2011; Farrelly & Brown, 2011). This
context may, in turn, create a situation in which both the physical infrastructure and the social
institutions become ‘locked in’ in past conﬁgurations that do not consider current and future
conditions, such as changing societal demands, decreasing public funding, and climate-related
water stresses (Willems, Busscher, Hijdra, & Arts, 2016).
In order to anticipate and address a change imperative such as major waterway renewal, the
central concern for planning research and practice is the organisation of collective action
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(Alexander, 2005). This organisation is conditioned by institutions, since they operate as “the
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North,
1991, p. 97). Institutions can be both formal (laws, regulations) and informal (social conventions,
norms). At the same time, institutions are the outcome of the organisation of collective action
(Giddens, 1984). As Mahoney and Thelen (2009, p. 4) argue, institutions are often treated as
enduring features that resist change. Institutions are inherently conservative and self-reinforcing:
this characteristic is their strength, yet also their weakness (Gupta et al., 2010). Hence, institutions
embody an interesting paradox: whereas institutions are typically regarded as entities bringing
predictability and stability, anticipating change and dynamism might put these entities under
pressure. Indeed, change imperatives such as waterway renewal may well call for ambiguity,
change and dynamism – elements that can be far from predictable and stable. In the light of
the anticipated waterway renewal, we have noted a research gap concerning the agency of actors
to bring about institutional change.
Emphasising the agency of actors in institutional theories at critical moments (Salet, 2018;
Sorensen, 2010) enables us to analyse how and why institutional change is initiated. Actors have
the ability to enhance processes of institutional reproduction (i.e. exploiting existing practices) and
processes of institutional change (i.e. exploring new practices) (Mahoney, 2000; March, 1991). We
aim to understand how actors perceive the critical juncture in waterway planning and which
institutional change actors ﬁnd feasible. To analyse institutional change in waterway planning, we
focus on agency and institutional dynamics from two key streams of institutionalism (new institu-
tional economics and socio-constructionist institutionalism). We will analyse institutional change in
the context of the highly mature Dutch inland waterway network currently undergoing a major
transformation. The Netherlands has proven forward-looking regarding waterway planning (OECD,
2014) and its institutional setting is well-established and well-documented (Arts, Filarski, Jeekel, &
Toussaint, 2016; Lintsen, 2002). Consequently, the Dutch waterway management system presents
a perfect case for exploring processes of institutional change in waterway renewal.
The structure of this article is as follows. The next section oﬀers a dynamic, actor-centred
perspective on institutions, based on the notion of path dependency. This theoretical section
works towards a framework for assessing actors’ motivations for institutional reproduction and
change from two institutional perspectives. The third section discusses the methodology and
introduces the case study of the Dutch national inland waterway network. The fourth section
presents the ﬁndings from both institutional perspectives in our case study, along with their
implications for waterway renewal. The ﬁnal section presents the conclusions and discussion.
Theoretical Framework
A Dynamic Perspective on Institutions: Path Dependency
Institutions condition actors to respondeither positively or negatively to change imperatives (Gupta et al.,
2010). Actors may ignore the change and discard it as irrelevant, or they may incorporate the change,
setting in motion a process of institutional change. Institutions typically hinder anticipating change
because they function as stable ﬁxtures structuring interactions between individuals, groups and
organisations through self-reinforcing mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mahoney & Thelen,
2009). The self-reinforcing nature of institutions is stressed in the concept of path dependency.
According to Sorensen (2015, p. 21), “[t]he core idea of ‘path dependence’ is that, once established,
some institutions tend to become increasingly diﬃcult to change over time, and so small choices early on
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can have signiﬁcant long-term impacts”. Originally, the concept of path dependency was applied to
explain ‘lock-ins’ in technical systems (Arthur, 1994; Unruh, 2000); currently, the concept is also widely
applied to the social sciences (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000) including the ﬁeld of planning (Bertolini,
2007; Sorensen, 2015).
Path dependency does not imply that institutions are ﬁxed or that rigidity is the sole potential
outcome. Rather, path dependency implies that changes are structured by conditions (Sorensen, 2015).
Actors will either follow or challenge established paths, leading to either a mechanism of institutional
reproduction or a mechanism of institutional change (Figure 1; Mahoney, 2000). As noted by March
(1991), both mechanisms are essential for institutions to cope with change, which is a complicated
balancing act. Tensions may arise between elements aiming to bring stability, and those looking for
experiment and novelty. Thus, actors need to navigate between reproduction and change.
This ability becomes even more important at critical junctures. In the development of infra-
structure networks, a phase of renewal can be considered such a juncture, which marks the need
for re-considering the functionality of the system (Bolton & Foxon, 2015). Sorensen (2010, p.281)
describes critical junctures as “exceptional times when agency can play a much larger role in
challenging existing institutions and establishing new policies that may in time become institu-
tionalized”. Hence, pursuing either institutional reproduction or institutional change at these
moments will have profound implications for the future of the infrastructure network.
Diﬀerent Path-Dependent Explanations from New Institutional Economics and Socio-
Constructionist Institutionalism
If we want to analyse the tensions that arise from actors pursuing either institutional reproduction or
change,weneed to further conceptualise how institutions are enactedby actors in practice (Healey, 2007;
Salet, 2018). Multiple conceptualisations for institutions as well as methodologies for researching institu-
tions have been proposed under the umbrella term of new institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The new
institutionalism can also be witnessed more and more in planning research (Kim, 2011; Verma, 2007).
Figure 1. Path dependencies (adapted from Mahoney, 2000; see also Matthews, 2013).
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Following DiMaggio (1998, p. 620), we can distinguish two major streams of institutionalism on
the basis of their theoretical orientation: a lens rooted in new institutional economics (NIE), and a
lens rooted in social-constructionist institutionalism (SCN) (for similar distinctions, see Buitelaar,
Lagendijk, & Jacobs, 2007; González & Healey, 2005; Inderberg, 2011). Though the streams have
diﬀerent theoretical (ontological) orientations, they share rather similar origins. On the one hand,
both lenses argue that institutions operate in human interactions as both enabling and constrain-
ing factors (Salet, 2018). On the other hand, both lenses treat institutions as endogenous factors
that can actively be created and re-created by actors (Kim, 2011). Both NIE and SCN have
developed distinct research traditions for analysing agency and institutional dynamics, in which
the mechanisms of reproduction and change are operationalised in diﬀerent ways (Mahoney,
2000). NIE presumes that institutions are inter-organisational arrangements, which actors will re-
create if this is in their self-interest based on voluntary rational choice. In contrast, SCN considers
institutions as cultural signiﬁers to which (groups of) actors can relate; actors will re-create
institutions if they are considered inappropriate. Table 1 provides an overview of the two diﬀerent
perspectives on institutional change. Linking the two perspectives oﬀers a complementary
account of institutions, considering the logic of both instrumentality and appropriateness
(Buitelaar et al., 2007). The NIE-lens predominantly considers how actors rationally seek eﬃcient
formal organisational arrangements, while the SCN-lens complements these ﬁndings with actors
looking for appropriate, often more informal types of institutions.
New Institutional Economics: A Logic of Instrumentality
The lens rooted in NIE presumes that the interactions between organisations to anticipate waterway
renewal comewith extra costs in addition to production costs (Williamson, 1998): organisations will have
to invest in getting to know each other and reaching agreement. NIE assumes that organisations are
internally driven to lower transaction costs. In theory, over time, more eﬃcient transactions will arise, as
organisations are expected to act rationally and to seek utility maximisation (Hall & Taylor, 1996;
Williamson, 1999). The transactions are governed by a system of organisational arrangements
(Williamson, 1998). These arrangements can be regarded as “a means to an end” that help organisations
to eﬃciently attain their sets of objectives (Inderberg, 2011, p. 305). Clearly deﬁned rights of ownership
are expected to result in an improved inter-organisational coordination and distribution of responsibil-
ities, with corresponding lower transaction costs. Consequently, the new institutional economics follows
a logic of instrumentality to smooth exchangesbetweenorganisations. This perspective regards planning
in terms of individuals voluntarily making joint decisions. To smooth their transactions, individuals
Table 1. A framework to research institutions from two lenses.
New Institutional Economics (NIE)
Socio-Constructionist Institutionalism
(SCN) Source
Key focus Institutions are organisational structures
that smooth human interactions in
order to achieve speciﬁc ends
Institutions are cultural signiﬁers that
shape human interaction, visible in
shared attitudes, norms and values
Hall and Taylor
(1996) and
Inderberg
(2011)
Understanding
institutional change
in practice
Institutions are assessed by individuals
against a logic of instrumentality
Institutions are assessed by individuals
against a logic of social appropriateness
March and Olsen
(1989) and
Williamson
(1998)
Research approach Analysis of actors’ considerations in their
search for eﬃcient organisational
structures by assessing the diﬀerent
transaction costs
Analysis of actors’ views on appropriate
cultural signiﬁers through interpretative
research rooted in a socio-
constructionist worldview
Hall and Taylor
(1996) and
González and
Healey (2005)
4 J. J. WILLEMS ET AL.
establish organisational arrangements, which, in the extreme, may result in either hierarchical organisa-
tions (through internalising activities) or a free market system (Alexander, 2001).
From this perspective of voluntary choice, organisations continuously monitor their transaction costs
to improve eﬃciency. A key assumption is that as long as current arrangements cost less than alternative
arrangements, current organisational structures will be reproduced. Institutional change will only occur
whenmaintaining the established arrangements is no longer in theorganisation’s interest. Such a change
is driven by a diﬀerent cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ, derived from the evaluation of institutional performance
(Mahoney, 2000) – in our case ensuring awell-functioningwaterway system.However, organisations tend
to focus on the here andnowandneglect the long termand the bigger picture (Levinthal &March, 1993).
Consequently, followingWilliamson (1999, p. 1105), transaction cost economics assumes that “previously
unrecognised regularities” will be detected by organisations along the way as these patterns aﬀect
organisational performance, and that these considerations will subsequently lead to instrumental
improvements in organisational arrangements, so the impact on organisational performance will be
mitigated.
Socio-Constructionist Institutionalism: A Logic of Appropriateness
The lens rooted in SCN is a cultural approach that examines “the socially embedded process of
institutionalisation” highlighting dialogue over decisions (Buitelaar et al., 2007, p. 895). This perspec-
tive sees institutions, not as instruments for achieving certain goals more eﬃciently, but rather as
operating as frameworks of meaning. Institutions thus serve a logic of social appropriateness, instead
of a logic of instrumentality (March & Olsen, 1989). The logic of appropriateness is expressed through
shared belief systems and practices, demonstrating that the ‘rules of the game’ are embedded in a
wider culture (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Discursive approaches in which language plays a central role are
often used to get a grip on the shared belief systems (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Van Hulst & Yanow,
2016). Organisations jointly construct meaning, thus determining the appropriate actions. This
meaning-making process results in discourses that allocate meaning to social and physical phenom-
ena reﬂected in a set of practices (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). Dominant discourses condition the
interactions between organisations through a logic of appropriateness. As a result, planners have
become aware of how the wider historical-institutional context (as visible in public norms, for
example) conditions speciﬁc planning practices (González & Healey, 2005).
As previous research has shown, organisations tend to comply with established discourses, a
process referred to as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Meyer and Rowan
(1977, p. 348) argue that this compliance demonstrates how organisations legitimatise their
existence by adhering to societal values that deﬁne what is considered appropriate. This inclina-
tion operates as a strong driver for the mechanism of reproduction (Mahoney, 2000). Discrepancies
between prevailing belief systems may challenge the dominant institutions, which subsequently
could set institutional change in motion. Such discrepancies can spring from actors’ changing
belief systems, expressing diﬀerent central concepts. Ultimately, these changes may result in the
breakdown of one discourse and another taking its place. Planning research, however, has mainly
shown instances of incremental institutional change, in which institutions adapt more slowly to
new circumstances (Healey, 1998).
A Synthesis
Table 2 summarises the two lenses and their perspectives on institutional reproduction and change.
In both strands, agents drive the mechanisms of change: institutional change is aﬀected by either
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new organisational trade-oﬀs, or by changes in organisations’ belief systems (Mahoney, 2000). The
framework presented in Table 2 helps to understand the motivations regarding why and how either
institutional reproduction or change is favoured by actors.
Methodology
Both institutional strands focus on the agency of organisations to modify established institutions.
In our analysis, we highlight how actors from key organisations approach waterway renewal and to
what extent they perceive current institutions as both instrumental and appropriate. Waterway
renewal is deﬁned as a critical juncture (see Figure 1), which, when it occurs, is a suitable
opportunity for reﬂecting whether established institutions in waterway planning still suﬃce. Our
analysis allows us to identify how actors pursue mechanisms of reproduction and change from two
perspectives (Table 2). We have examined actors’ motivations in the context of a case study of the
Dutch inland waterway network, which will be introduced ﬁrst.
Introduction to the Case Study
The Dutch national inland waterway network is among the oldest transportation networks in the
Netherlands. Many components, such as weirs, locks and bridges, were built in the 1920s and
1930s (Van Dorsser, 2015). In addition, a review of academic literature on the case study (Arts et al.,
2016; Lintsen, 2002; Van den Brink, 2009) shows the path-dependent nature of the Dutch water-
way network, due to a ﬁrmly established institutional setting dating back to the Napoleonic era
(late 18th century). Originating from that time, the Dutch Constitution establishes the state’s
responsibility to make the land suitable for human habitation and to protect and improve the
living environment. Providing infrastructure is a public task in the Netherlands. The Ministry of
Infrastructure & Water Management spends approximately 2.5% of the Dutch GDP on infrastruc-
ture development, management and operation annually (Statistics Netherlands, 2016). This has led
to the development of institutions in which the national government has the right of ownership to
develop infrastructure. For instance, the government-led authority Rijkswaterstaat was founded in
1798 to develop and operate the waterways across the Netherlands. At present, Rijkswaterstaat is
the executive arm of the national Ministry of Infrastructure & Water Management. The Ministry and
Rijkswaterstaat are the main parties responsible for the national waterways. Due to decreasing
public funding, the national government is investigating co-ﬁnancing arrangements with regional
and local governments. Strict legal procedures for infrastructure investments necessitate consulta-
tion with regional and local stakeholders (see Arts et al., 2016). This consultation was typiﬁed by
the OECD (Organisation for Economic and Co-operative Development) (2014, p. 17) as “a distinc-
tive ‘polder approach’, which values concerted, consensus-based decision-making”. The national
government has traditionally been the most powerful national actor in waterway development,
exerting full control. This is exempliﬁed by the central role Rijkswaterstaat played in the formation
Table 2. The two institutional strands oﬀer diﬀerent explanations for institutional reproduction and change
(adapted from Mahoney, 2000).
Mechanism of reproduction Mechanism of change
NIE: Logic of
instrumentality
Rational cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ (lowering
transaction costs)
New insights leading to new trade-oﬀ: challenging the
instrumentality
SCN: Logic of
appropriateness
Reconﬁrming appropriateness; ‘compliance to
the norm’
Changes in the values of actors: challenging the
appropriateness
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of the Netherlands (Lintsen, 2002), which has created a discourse that values technical expertise
and made waterway management mainly an aﬀair for engineers (Arts et al., 2016; Van den Brink,
2009). Recently, with the integration of new functions such as ecology and recreation (related to
the Integrated Water Resources Management), the national government has been repositioned as
an initiating or facilitating actor, leaving more room for other parties to pursue their waterway-
related interests (Hijdra, Arts, & Woltjer, 2014). These other parties are primarily public bodies, such
as regional and local governments, but may also be private parties (e.g. container terminals,
surrounding land-use owners, farmers). Despite the emergence of new institutions, the established
institutional setting remains dominant. To illustrate, the Dutch national Council for the
Environment and Infrastructure recently concluded that a sectoral way of working, occupied
with realising new transport capacity, still prevails in Dutch planning practice (Council for the
Environment and Infrastructure, 2018).
The current waterway network is ageing and requires major upgrades (Deltaprogramma, 2012;
EIB, 2016; Van Dorsser, 2015). For example, 52 out of 137 navigation locks require renewal before
2040 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2015). The increased number of ageing assets has prompted a search for
new ways of working that will guarantee a well-functioning system in which the organisations
involved may have new roles to play (Van der Vlist, Roovers, & Barneveld, 2016). In our study, this
search is regarded as an excellent opportunity for actors to reﬂect critically on the established
institutions: do the organisations involved believe that current institutions suﬃce in a context of
waterway renewal? And if not, how should the institutions be altered following the logics of
instrumentality and appropriateness?
Data Collection and Analysis
To examine which institutional change actors believe is required for Dutch waterway renewal, we
conducted 23 interviews in two rounds. We interviewed senior oﬃcials working for key organisa-
tions in the waterways, such as the Ministry of Infrastructure & Water Management, its executive
agency Rijkswaterstaat, regional governments (provinces), the logistic sector and port authorities,
knowledge institutes, consultancies and construction companies (see Appendix 1). Each interview
consisted of a reﬂection on current practices and interactions in concrete waterway examples and
projects. The goal was to reveal existing institutions and to create a discussion on (required)
changes in these practices. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. Summaries were
sent to the interviewees for conﬁrmation.
The practices and interactions mentioned in the interview transcripts were interpreted and
translated into established institutions and proposals for modiﬁcation of these institutions. The
qualitative data computer programme Atlas.ti was used to code the transcripts. All interviews were
coded twice: ﬁrst from the NIE-perspective; then from the SCN-perspective. Concerning NIE, right
of ownership is a deﬁning concept (e.g. the right to use or modify the waterway), which is
reﬂected in the legal responsibilities (mandates) and ﬁnancial structures. To operationalise SCN,
the shared belief system and practices were further divided according to content (what are the key
values and practices in the culture?), roles (which roles do the parties have to play and why?) and
argumentation (is the culture based on coherent and consistent reasoning?) (Fisher, 1997). As
such, the coding process started with a deductively constructed code tree with two families of
institutional structures and cultures.
We deﬁned actors’ views of the institutions at two moments in time (Figure 1). As we were
examining a highly advanced institutional setting, the established institutions according to actors
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were taken as the initial conditions (t = 1 in Figure 1). Waterway renewal is operationalised as the
critical juncture (t = 2), at which moment actors will assess if institutions can still be considered
instrumental and appropriate (Table 2). This assessment may trigger both institutional reproduc-
tion and institutional change (t = 3). Institutional reproduction is considered in a continuation of
rights of ownership and dominant discourses, institutional change in proposed changes in rights
and discourses. Our ﬁndings show what will take place: institutional reproduction, institutional
change or both.
Actors’ Views on Institutional Change for Renewal in the Dutch National Inland
Waterways
This section presents the empirical ﬁndings regarding actors’ views on institutional reproduction
and institutional change in the Dutch national inland waterways triggered by waterway renewal.
The following sub-sections discuss the ﬁndings from the NIE-perspective (in which actors are
driven by a logic of instrumentality) and the SCN-perspective (in which actors are driven by a logic
of appropriateness) respectively (summarised in Table 3).
Actors’ Views On Instrumental Institutions
Initial Conditions: Current Institutions
All interviewees conﬁrmed that providing infrastructure is considered a public task in the
Netherlands. For instance, as interviewee #3 from the logistics sector puts it, the national govern-
ment has a duty to cater for smooth inland navigation and water safety. The right of ownership
lies with the national government, more speciﬁcally the Ministry of Infrastructure & Water
Management (responsible for policy-making) and its executive agency Rijkswaterstaat (for the
day-to-day operation). The right of ownership is reﬂected in the national government’s responsi-
bilities to safeguard the primary aims of the waterways, i.e. ensuring waterborne transportation
and guaranteeing water discharge for water safety purposes. Interviewees state that the national
government’s overarching objective for the waterways is to maintain a system that does not fail
these tasks. As interviewee #9 argues, “[maintaining an advanced system] is quite a challenge in
itself”. Although the national government has full control, the Ministry is obliged to consult with
regional and local parties on investments in the waterways. Other parties that intend to use or
modify the waterways rely on the national government, as the Ministry has to approve their plans.
The existing institutions (t = 1 in Figure 1) developed to secure current waterway performance
to maximise utility, can be typiﬁed as formal and hierarchical, with clear responsibilities for each
party (captured in legal and ﬁnancial agreements). Every year, the Ministry approves the national
infrastructure budgets, which are derived from the national Infrastructure Fund (for transportation
such as highways and waterways) and Delta Fund (for the national water system) (Arts et al., 2016).
These funds run until 2030, with allocated budgets for infrastructure construction and mainte-
nance. According to interviewee #5, who works for the Ministry, the construction budget is
expected to resolve the major bottlenecks in the transportation systems before 2030, based on
current scenarios. In addition, there are funds for maintenance and operation, which executive
authority Rijkswaterstaat uses to ensure smooth operation of the transportation system. This
budget category includes renewal and renovation (I&M, 2017).
Waterway renewal has been operationalised as a task primarily for the infrastructure operator.
Organisational arrangements between the strategically-operating Ministry and its implementer
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Rijkswaterstaat streamline the allocated funds. Over time, the responsibilities and exchanges have
been formalised and institutionalised. As a result, interviewees #5 and #14 perceive the transaction
costs as relatively low, as the parties know each other well and the aims are clear. As considerable
budgets are involved, accountability to parliament is important. The process is streamlined in strict
procedures that prescribe responsibilities and budget allocations between the Ministry and
Rijkswaterstaat. Given that Rijkswaterstaat as the operator has more hands-on knowledge, the
Ministry tries to overcome information asymmetries, for instance by commissioning Rijkswaterstaat
to deliver an overview of the technical state of the waterway network to the Ministry every two
years. The executive agency underscores that renewal is mainly a technical exercise. Interviewees
argue that the need for consultation with other parties is limited, since renewal often does not
lead to altered or new functionalities. A Rijkswaterstaat employee (interviewee #13) speciﬁes that:
“All kinds of infrastructure assets in the national inland waterway system are reaching their technical
end-of-life-cycle. We just ask [the Ministry] for money to replace those assets. That is the common
procedure, which remains within the technical domain.”
To conclude, the NIE-perspective reveals that actors perceive institutions focusing on the budget and
technical issues as instrumental. Consequently, the organisational arrangements centre on the Ministry
and Rijkswaterstaat and do not have much political inﬂuence, so transaction costs are perceived as low.
Critical Juncture: Instrumental Institutions for Renewal
For waterway renewal (t = 2 in Figure 1), the public task of providing infrastructure is not
questioned. Interviewees argue that, if the infrastructure starts deteriorating, the national govern-
ment has a responsibility to continue (or even upgrade) current performance levels. The right of
ownership remains unaﬀected. The growing importance of waterway renewal has incited
Rijkswaterstaat to start several exploratory studies. These studies can be considered a reﬂection
on existing institutions and have led to new insights and demands on how to approach renewal.
The project Renewal Challenge Hydraulic Works (in Dutch: Vervangingsopgave Natte
Kunstwerken) and an exploratory study on the Meuse river (Grip op de Maas) have raised awareness
that replacing waterway assets on a one-to-one basis might lead to a ‘lock-in’ of the current
waterway system with dated functionalities. As a Rijkswaterstaat interviewee (#20) argues, repla-
cing assets one by one “implies that (. . .) the [waterway] system conﬁguration will also function for
the long term, that it is durable.” Interviewees became aware that waterway renewal is not purely
related to maintenance. As interviewee #13 illustrates with an example:
“[The asset] is part of a waterway system, which has been designed for [speciﬁc purposes]. By now,
these purposes have changed. So you want to replace [an asset] for a dated objective. . . Shouldn’t we
take a closer look? Well, that was not commonplace.”
This quote demonstrates that various alternatives for renewing waterway assets may exist, besides
simply replacing them. As a result, renewal discussions acquire a political dimension that questions
existing functionalities. In addition, functionalities such as recreation, energy generation, and
ecological issues are increasingly incorporated into waterway planning. Waterway renewal is no
longer only the sole responsibility of the operator Rijkswaterstaat. Other parties are also getting
involved. Thus, actors put the instrumentality of current institutions into question, marking a shift
from technical, hierarchal organisational arrangements towards more functional, relational
arrangements.
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Interviewees propose several modiﬁcations of established institutions tomove away from an arrange-
ment in which theMinistry and Rijkswaterstaat take the lead. The ﬁrst modiﬁcation relates to the funding
source. At the moment, the Infrastructure and Delta Funds only provide funding for one-to-one renewal
from the maintenance budget (Figure 2). For additional functionalities, new funding sources have to be
found. Interviewee #4 from the Ministry indicates that the Ministry has gained experience with co-
ﬁnancing water system projects with fellow governments, for instance in the national Delta Programme
(Deltaprogramma) and the Flood Protection Programme (Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma) in which
national and regional governments operate together. A similar approach is taken in the transportation
sector which follows the national programming, planning and budgeting (PPB) framework of key Dutch
national infrastructure projects. This framework encompasses the Multi-Year Programme for
Infrastructure, Land Use and Transport (Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport) and
translates strategic transportation policies into speciﬁc national projects. The PPB-framework extensively
describes the rules of the game for national and regional parties to negotiate and decide upon either the
construction of new infrastructure or the renewal of existing infrastructure (see Arts et al., 2016).
Positioning waterway renewal in the national programming, planning and budgeting frame-
work creates a new institutional setting, in which the Ministry (and its executive agency,
Rijkswaterstaat) is no longer the only player responsible. Transactions between diﬀerent levels of
government become the core focus. The Ministry has declared that it is willing to discuss regional
Figure 2. Renewal as perceived by the Ministry of Infrastructure & Water Management (adapted from I&M, 2016).
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initiatives, as interviewee #4 demonstrates: “You can link [your ambitions to ours] and participate.
But if you want to join, you’ll have to contribute ﬁnancially, too.” Even so, these discussions take
place within certain boundaries (rights of ownership), as national interests can overrule regional
ambitions: “If you want to arm wrestle, you shouldn’t do that with us of course.” (interviewee #4)
Some (though not yet all) provinces see an opportunity to connect regional ambitions to national
renewal projects. As interviewee #8 from a province explains, “If you have ambitions [as a province],
you have to take your responsibility. And in ﬁnancial terms, too.” The latter two quotes illustrate that
discussions can easily turn to ﬁnances (Figure 2). Although the Ministry argues that it is best for
other parties to join this new ‘game’, regional parties feel that the sectoral (transportation) angle is
still dominant, since the Ministry is constricted by ﬁxed budgets and can overrule regional parties.
A Ministry employee conﬁrms: “Only when there are great ideas [from regional parties] can we
explore whether we can expand our budget. It does not work the other way around.” (interviewee #4)
Moreover, the new arrangements currently operate in a rather informal way and, according to
interviewee #10, strongly rely on regional political ambitions. As a consequence, arrangements
become more open, yet also appear more ad hoc.
In these new political arrangements, Rijkswaterstaat has diﬃculty deﬁning its responsibility.
Interviewees from Rijkswaterstaat perceive themselves as operators with the ability to raise issues
with the Ministry. A consultant (interviewee #1) observes that Rijkswaterstaat likes to attend
negotiations within the national PPB-framework as a neutral party (the operator as the expert
that other parties can consult with), but regional governments consider Rijkswaterstaat a repre-
sentative of the Ministry. As interviewee #16 from Rijkswaterstaat conﬁrms, “We are not indepen-
dent.” Being one of the parties at the table, Rijkswaterstaat is also less familiar with combining its
own interests with those of the others, as the agency considers its own interests of higher national
importance. For example, interviewee #12 argues: “[Rijkswaterstaat] should not suddenly allow
activities that may harm the way our waterway network currently functions. You have to be very
alert in that respect, (. . .) or else you’ll devalue your own system.”
Regional and local governments gain more responsibilities and are often represented by the Dutch
provinces. Whereas some provinces are active in connecting waterway developments with regional
economic development (e.g. Overijssel, Noord-Brabant), others are more hesitant or even unaware of
the possibilities. Interviewee #7 from the latter group of provinces argues that the Ministry should
initiate waterway (re-)development programmes which regions can join later. However, the Ministry
takes a similar perspective in waiting for regional initiatives because, according to interviewees #4 and
#5, waitingwill reveal what certain projects are really worth to the regions. Other regional parties, such
as semi-public agencies (e.g. energy companies), can participate in renewal developments, but so far,
their contributions can be seen only in small-scale pilots initiated by the national government.
Private parties have not experienced great changes in their responsibilities. To illustrate,
interviewees #2 and #22 (from the logistics sector and water construction companies, respectively)
argue that they remain fully dependent on the national government, as waterway development
remains a public task. The interviewees acknowledge that they have good connections within the
national government, so they can raise potential concerns.
As the division of responsibilities becomes more messy (and is still under discussion), approach-
ing waterway renewal within the national programming, planning and budgeting scheme with a
view to including more functional discussions about the waterways, may add to the ambiguity.
This approach may increase transaction costs between parties. As interviewee #1 observes, “It is
likely that a mismatch will arise between the agendas and rhythms of the diﬀerent parties”. At the
same time, the playing ﬁeld is still undeﬁned: interviewees have diﬀerent views on what is most
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instrumental. Various views underline the diﬀerent operationalisation of utility maximisation,
which has changed for some by broadening the goal of renewal. Still, reasserting the dominant
path, a group of interviewees question to what extent the PPB-framework is suitable for renewal
and whether the current organisational arrangements already suﬃce. These existing institutions
are currently expanding (thus slowly changing) with an explicit assignment to inventory potential
renewal options that adhere to the national PPB-framework, as seen in Rijkswaterstaat’s updated
strategic vision on renewal and renovation (I&M, 2016).
To conclude, institutional change occurs through extending the dominant organisational
arrangements as the outcome of new insights and demands (Table 3; t = 3 in Figure 1): in addition
to a technical focus (a result of institutional reproduction), a functional perspective (institutional
change) has emerged that is presented by actors as more instrumental with the potential to
approach waterway renewal in a more comprehensive fashion that includes national and regional
actors. However, the functional perspective has yet to be explored in practice.
Actors’ Views on Appropriate Institutions
For the SCN-perspective, we re-constructed institutions that actors ﬁnd appropriate based on
content, roles and argumentation. As with the previous section, we looked at current institutions
and institutions for renewal.
Initial Conditions: Current Institutions
Interviewees identiﬁed the reliability of the waterway system for the main users (shipping) as a central
concept in the discourse on waterway renewal. Smooth operation of the waterway network is
appropriate, as reﬂected in speciﬁc performance levels (e.g. navigation locks have to be available
98% of the time) that are set by the Ministry of Infrastructure & Water Management and with which its
executive authority, Rijkswaterstaat, has to comply. To illustrate the focus on performance, interviewee
#4 refers to former minister Karla Peijs (2003–2007) who often emphasised how important it is to
“maintain what we have got” (in Dutch: “houwen voor bouwen”). From this perspective, ageing
infrastructure could challenge the performance of a waterway network. As infrastructure ages, “more
attention is being paid to regular maintenance and renewal.” (interviewee #5).
Emphasis on performance has clear implications for the management of the network. The main
player, Rijkswaterstaat is responsible for preserving access. According to interviewee 9, “A typical
operator is rather conservative, it is someone who just wants to get it right. So (s)he will always rebuild
what was there, as (s)he knows it was of good quality.” In other words, a proven system should be
maintained. Interviewees from Rijkswaterstaat perceive themselves as apolitical and rational experts:
“We have become an executive agency and as a result [we have been placed] outside of the political
domain. (. . .) We are judged on reliability.” (interviewee #19) Rijkswaterstaat translates the objectives
from the Ministry to speciﬁc performance indicators (e.g. ‘service level agreements’) and projects
resonating new public management thinking with ‘value for money’ principles. In this respect,
Rijkswaterstaat relies on its technical knowledge base, explained by interviewee #1:
“[This reliance on technical knowledge encompasses] a feasibility or steerability way of thinking of
Rijkswaterstaat. You can construct a completely rational system [with] performance indicators which
you then translate for the diﬀerent branches that you have to manage, but I do not believe in that
approach.”
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To summarise, the institutions that actors regard as promoting appropriate actions are risk-averse,
rationality-driven and somewhat conservative (t = 1 in Figure 1). In this discourse, Rijkswaterstaat
plays a central role.
Within the context of waterway renewal, a culture has emerged which reasons that if an asset in
the waterway network reaches its technical end of life, it will be replaced to safeguard perfor-
mance. Interviewee #14 explains:
“When a piece of infrastructure no longer functions, and so technically is written oﬀ, well, you’ll have to
make an investment to bring the asset back to its previous level. The goal is then linked to maintaining
the current waterway network.”
As Rijkswaterstaat is in charge, the regional stakeholders had limited awareness of the emer-
ging issue of waterway renewal and the Ministry did not initially perceive renewal as its
responsibility. Interviewee #12 states that “[Renewal] is a task that is on the agenda of
Rijkswaterstaat as the responsible operator and maintainer of the waterways.” This perception is
reinforced because renewal issues are programmed by Rijkswaterstaat within the available
budgets (Figure 2).
Critical Juncture: Appropriate Institutions for Renewal
In view of many waterway assets needing renewal, interviewees still consider a focus on perfor-
mance and reliability as appropriate, but expanded with novel, additional concepts. According to
interviewee #13, the focus has been too much on minor, technical elements (the “nuts and bolts”)
and on isolated objects. Instead, interviewees would prefer to include wider developments. For
instance, interviewee #14 states:
“Being able to provide additional input based on what you see in regard to the functionality [of the
waterway system], and in regard to the surroundings? What do I have to take into account? That
[question] is really new.”
These issues all relate to the current conﬁguration of the network. As a result, a shift in content
and argumentation can be observed: what is considered appropriate is extended to the notion of
functionality. With this concept, waterway renewal becomes not just a way to maintain the current
system in order to safeguard performance, but also an opportunity to integrate diﬀerent devel-
opments and to transform the waterway network. For instance, interviewee #8 argues that renewal
is an opportunity for his region to boost the current regional economic situation.
In this discourse, in which actors stress the possibilities of transforming the network, the parties
involved are developing new roles. TheMinistry of Infrastructure &WaterManagement, for instance, aims
tomove away from its prescriptive role. According to interviewee #4, “[Taking the lead] is a position we do
not want so much anymore. Others just lean back, they think that it is the national government’s turn, they
will pay, so we do not have to think about renewal.” Instead, the Ministry is looking for initiatives shared
with regional and local governments to create widely supported waterway renewal plans. Still, the
Ministry remains a dominant player: “We obviously have a clear role, as we are the party with the large
sums of money. (. . .) Without us those major infrastructure projects cannot proceed.” (interviewee #4) Also,
theMinistry stresses that initiatives need to be sober and eﬀective. Other parties wanting to participate in
renewal projects have to contribute ﬁnancially, as budgets are limited (see Figure 2). Theremust be a clear
synergy and, with infrastructure on the cusp of breaking down, there is a clear time horizon before plans
and projects have to be ﬁnalised.
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On the regional level, the province as the regional government, considers itself a linking force that can
bring together varied interests. Provinces are already familiar with this role from having had to deal with
many cases involving adjacent land use. Provinces argue that they often know their region better than
the Ministry or Rijkswaterstaat. Interviewees distinguished two types of provincial roles. Some provinces
take a traditional ‘wait-and-see’ stance. Only once the national government has launched a plan for their
region will provinces lobby to incorporate their regional interests in the plan. For them, the Ministry
remains a “black box” (interviewee #7) which “is still operating from its ivory tower in The Hague” (#8). Other
provinces are pro-active and often have ambitious regional development agendas. For instance, inter-
viewee #10 from the province of Overijssel states: “Weare actively looking to expand the renewal challenge
to logistic opportunities for Overijssel. (. . .) How can we achieve more economic growth to beneﬁt from
[renewal] as much as possible?” Provinces actively approach the national government with their ideas,
often backed by a regional lobby of either businesses or citizens’ initiatives. Since provinces typically
provide additional ﬁnancial resources, synergywith national ambitions canbe created. Currently, the pro-
active stance seems to be favoured by the Ministry.
The interviewees have less clear ideas about a possible role for Rijkswaterstaat. On the one hand,
Rijkswaterstaat is commissioned by the Ministry. As the Ministry argues, “We have to keep Rijkswaterstaat
focussing on [functional issues], too.” (interviewee #5) On the other hand, Rijkswaterstaat has most of the
expert knowledge on the waterway system as the agency handles its day-to-day operation. Discussions
between the Ministry and regional governments can lead to novel conﬁgurations of the waterway
system; Rijkswaterstaat will basically have to comply with the outcomes. Interviewee #20, working at
Rijkswaterstaat, argues: “Anything is possible, but we are responsible for the system.” Rijkswaterstaat’s focus
on the operation of the network may clash with functional negotiations by the Ministry and regional
governments. Here, a discrepancy can be observed between the established, risk-averse discourse of
reliability and the emerging discourse that is opportunity-driven and open to new initiatives.
In this emerging stream, a relatively diﬀerent belief system around appropriateness has devel-
oped in which actors emphasise that the larger picture should be taken into account. From this
perspective, renewal is not just a technical issue, but relates to the waterway system (what do we
want to do with the waterway system and the surrounding region? – an object-related question)
and to parties’ aims (who to involve? – a more process-related question). As interviewee #6
observes, “Other parties were in the comfortable position of complaining about Rijkswaterstaat and
the Ministry, but that does not hold anymore.” Nevertheless, the national government remains
powerful as it has both the largest budget (Ministry) and the expertise (Rijkswaterstaat). To
conclude, institutional change is slowly occurring, and the concept of appropriateness is being
expanded by actors, by incorporating a more functional, relational understanding of waterway
renewal in an addition to the operator-dominated perspective (Table 3; t = 3 in Figure 1).
Table 3. Institutional reproduction and change in the Dutch inland waterway network.
Mechanism of reproduction Mechanism of change
NIE: Logic of instrumentality Advancement of a technical approach, ﬁnanced
by regular maintenance budgets; Ministry and
Rijkswaterstaat are leading actors
Rise of a new functional and relational
approach: using the PPB-framework for co-
ﬁnancing with national and regional parties
→ Transactions oriented towards the here
and now
→ “Broader” transactions oriented
towards the long term and the bigger picture
SCN: Logic of appropriateness Continuation of an operator-dominated (i.e.
Rijkswaterstaat) culture that takes a technical
perspective on waterway renewal
Emergence of a more strategic, functional
discourse that questions current waterway
conﬁgurations with wide stakeholder
involvement
→ Actors espousing the dominant
discourse
→ Actors questioning the dominant
discourse with novel concepts
14 J. J. WILLEMS ET AL.
Conclusions and Discussion
With waterway networks in the Western world ageing, waterway renewal has become a change
imperative for redeveloping and transforming networks to meet current and future demands. For
waterway planning and management, renewal brings up strategic considerations of what we want
to do with mature networks. The aim of our article was to understand from two diﬀerent
institutional perspectives how actors perceive the change imperative of anticipating waterway
renewal and which institutional change actors ﬁnd feasible. We see institutions not as stable
entities – although they are often depicted as such – but rather as dynamic entities that actors can
re-create. The literature on path dependency demonstrates how anticipating change can be
strongly conditioned by established institutional paths. On these paths, both institutional repro-
duction and institutional change occurs. For the successful anticipation of waterway renewal,
actors need to navigate between reproduction and change – i.e. exploit current practices and
explore new ones (March, 1991).
We have developed a framework that enables identiﬁcation of these two mechanisms as
approached from new institutional economics and socio-constructionist institutionalism. The
approaches presume diﬀerent motivations as to why either institutional reproduction or institu-
tional change is chosen. For new institutional economics, actors are driven by a logic of instru-
mentality; in the socio-constructionist institutionalism, actors adhere to a logic of appropriateness
(Table 2). We explored actors’ motivations from both institutional angles in a case study of the
Dutch national inland waterway network. Our results demonstrate that newly established transac-
tions consider the longer term and wider regional developments leading to diﬀerent trade-oﬀs;
new interpretations not only include technical aspects of the ageing infrastructure but also
examine its functionality (Table 3). Still, in line with previous research (Banister et al., 2011;
Farrelly & Brown, 2011), we ﬁnd that existing institutions largely condition how waterway renewal
is approached. This indicates that the balance between institutional reproduction and change is
currently tipping towards the former. Accordingly, actors perceive discarding existing institutions
as not instrumental and inappropriate, and rather opt for modifying and complementing them
with new institutions to make them ‘work’. Thus, new institutions are emerging, which Mahoney
and Thelen (2009) refer to as institutional layering.
The implications for planning practice are a broadening of approaches to waterway renewal
(Figure 3). The analysis from both theoretical perspectives shows that, in addition to the dominant
path (A in Figure 3), a new path is emerging (B). Indeed, we have observed a shift from
approaching renewal as a technical and ﬁnancial issue (focused on isolated objects) towards an
issue that requires functional-relational discussions related to wider system implications. In our
case, these discussions aim to enhance the coherence between national infrastructure investments
and regional spatial developments, for instance through exploring potential synergies. Thus, the
technical-hierarchical way of working was seen by interviewees as inappropriate, since renewal
requires larger-scale discussions about the future of the waterway network. Likewise, with this
broader scope in mind, the instrumentality of the existing institutions was considered inadequate.
Interviewees argued that, depending on the size of waterway assets, either a more technical or a
more functional approach may be followed. A reconsideration by actors of the logics of instru-
mentality and appropriateness thus leads to a diversiﬁcation of approaches to renewal. For
planning theory and practice, these ﬁndings demonstrate that actors deliberately aim to bring
about institutional change to tailor institutions to a new situation. As existing institutions are
mainly complemented by new ones, institutional change in our highly institutionalised case study
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proves to be an incremental process. Given the exploratory nature of our empirical work, future
research can further ground these ﬁndings.
More generally, our research indicates that institutional change is accelerated once actors
deliberately put the dominant logics of instrumentality and appropriateness under pressure. This
ﬁnding raises the question of whether planners have the capacity to enhance mechanisms for
institutional change. Since institutions tend to reinforce themselves, questioning established
institutions does not come easy. Our case study of the institutional setting in the Dutch inland
waterway network was no diﬀerent in that respect. The questioning of institutions – and proposed
modiﬁcations to institutions – often stays within the realm of exploratory studies yet to be raised
in actual practice. Our ﬁndings reconﬁrm the vested interests in both the waterway infrastructure
and the institutions in which the national government plays a leading role (e.g. in terms of right of
ownership and being the main ﬁnancial contributor). Both institutional perspectives oﬀered
diﬀerent insights for agents pursuing institutional change. From a new institutional economics
perspective, actors began to re-create institutions once they observed promising co-ﬁnancing
arrangements between diﬀerent levels of governments. From a socio-constructionist institution-
alism perspective, established institutions were perceived as inadequate, because their focus was
considered too ‘engineeristic’. Hence, new institutions that stress functional-relational aspects
were developed. Together, both institutional perspectives oﬀer clues as to how more integrative
forms of waterway planning can be achieved. From both perspectives, institutional change can be
fostered through the incorporation of multiple stakeholders, either through co-ﬁnancing arrange-
ments (perceived as more eﬃcient than ‘siloed’ policy processes) or through functional-relational
discussions in which a wider array of stakeholders participate (perceived as more appropriate than
a mono-functional, engineering focus). Cases of infrastructure renewal are likely to appear more in
the future, with questions about institutional change becoming more apparent. Our case study is
an initial examination. Future research may further substantiate the role of change agents in
eﬀectuating institutional change.
Figure 3. Institutional layering in the Dutch inland waterway system for waterway renewal.
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Appendix 1. List of interviewees
# Position Organisation Location Date
1 Senior consultant/Lecturer Antea Group/Saxion University of
Applied Sciences
Deventer 13-10-2016
2 Head of Nautical & Technical Aﬀairs BLN-Koninklijke Schuttevaer (Union
for shippers)
By telephone 16-11-2016
3 Secretary Dutch Union of Inland Shipping By telephone 15-11-2016
4 Deputy head water policy and safety Ministry of Infrastructure & the
Environment
The Hague 24-05-2017
5 Deputy head inland waterways
transport division
Ministry of Infrastructure & the
Environment
The Hague 08-11-2016
6 Head of Operations Port Authority Amsterdam Amsterdam 18-01-2017
7 Senior advisor water and spatial
development
Province of Gelderland Arnhem 12-12-2016
8 Senior advisor mobility Province of Noord-Brabant Den Bosch 11-01-2017
9 Programme leader asset manager Province of Noord-Holland Haarlem 09-05-2017
10 Senior advisor freight transportation
and logistics
Province of Overijssel Zwolle 05-01-2017
11 Programme manager Province of Overijssel Zwolle 05-01-2017
12 Senior advisor network development Rijkswaterstaat Utrecht 05-10-2016
13 Senior advisor Rijkswaterstaat Utrecht 08-11-2016
14 Senior advisor asset management Rijkswaterstaat Utrecht 21-11-2016
15 Advisor nautical aﬀairs Rijkswaterstaat Arnhem 12-12-2016
16 Senior advisor Rijkswaterstaat Den Bosch 11-01-2017
17 Senior advisor network development Rijkswaterstaat Rotterdam 17-01-2017
18 Senior advisor network management Rijkswaterstaat Rotterdam 17-01-2017
19 Special advisor asset management Rijkswaterstaat Zwolle 29-05-2017
20 Special advisor adaptive water
management/Associate Professor
Rijkswaterstaat/Wageningen
University & Research
Utrecht 28-06-2017
21 Senior scientist asset management TNO Research institute Delft 03-11-2016
22 Director Union of Water Constructers Den Haag 13-10-2016
23 Lecturer/Senior consultant University of Technology Delft/
Mercurius Shipping Group
Delft 17-10-2016
20 J. J. WILLEMS ET AL.
